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Through analysis of the dynamics of decision-making on migration in Sicily, this paper shows how party 
elites define strategies to politicise (or not) the migration issue. Conventional explanations of the 
politicization of immigration have largely neglected decision-making processes and explicitly ignored 
the reasoning of political actors, assuming that cognitive factors and strategic considerations are less 
relevant in the migration policy domain than in others. They conversely assume that party elites 
politicise migration in reaction to pressures caused by increasing flows or issue salience, anti-migrant 
public attitudes and/or far right propaganda. In contrast, this paper shows how actors’ understandings of 
migration flows and of public reactions are formed, and how they shape or influence the dynamics of 
politicisation. By doing so, the paper develops three key arguments. First, it is not self-evident that 
increases in migration flows, issue salience and/or social mobilisations lead to political contestation of 
migration or initiate reactive responses by political elites. Second, party elites’ decisions to politicise 
migration or not are shaped by their understandings of the effects of migration on underlying social 
systems rather than by objective evidence about public attitudes or social mobilisations. Third, these 
understandings are embedded in narratives, influenced by inherited traditions, and reinforced by the 
outputs of the very decision-making dynamics that they contribute to shape. To develop these arguments, 
the paper adopts an actor-centred constructivist approach and investigates decision-making dynamics 
by applying insights from framing theories and sensemaking approaches. 
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This paper shows the unexpected dynamics of politicisation of migration in Sicily, a region of Europe 
which was centrally affected by the migration crisis but where migration is not the object of (negative) 
political contestation. By illustrating how in Sicily objective events and incidents such as high migration 
flows, high issue salience and anti migrant public attitudes do not lead to politicisation, the paper aims 
to contribute to the broader debate on the politicisation of migration, showing that cognitive frames and 
their influence on strategic decisions are a crucial but missing part of the puzzle. 
Accounts of the politicization of migration, indeed, tend to see it as the result of objective and 
measurable factors: an increase in migration flows; the consequent increase in issue salience, anti-
migrant attitudes and social mobilisations; or the issue entrepreneurship of right-wing parties (Grande 
et al., 2018; Zurn, 2012; Van der Brug et al. 2015, Castelli Gattinara, 2017). The undeniable observation 
that conflicts over immigration have become salient in national elections and evidently impacted on the 
political agendas of governments has, however, led most of the scholarship to largely neglect decision-
making processes and actors’ beliefs. Most of the literature neglects the reasoning of political actors, 
assuming that cognitive factors and strategic considerations are less relevant in the immigration policy 
domain and that party elites necessarily politicise migration under the pressure of increasing flows, issue 
salience and the propaganda of the far right (Abou-Chadi and Helbling, 2018: 700). Put differently, most 
of the existing literature on politicisation focuses on how ideas in the migration policy field are 
contested, but not on how understandings of flows and of public reactions are produced in the first place 
and acted upon. This holds true, despite eminent scholarly works (Cohen et al., 1972; Brunsson, 1985; 
Kingdon, 2014) having illustrated the potential decoupling of problems and choices during the decision-
making process. 
This paper shows, instead, how actors’ subjective understandings of migration flows and of public 
reactions are formed, and how they shape or influence dynamics of political contestation of migration. 
By doing so, the paper challenges some of the assumptions of the existing literature to argue that: first, 
it is not self-evident that increases in migration flows, in the salience of migration, and in social 
mobilisations lead to political contestation of the issue or initiate reactive responses by party elites 
(potential decoupling of problems and solutions). Second, party elites’ decisions to politicise migration 
(or not) are not shaped by objective evidence about public attitudes or social mobilisations. Rather, they 
are shaped by their understandings of the effects of migration on underlying social systems, formed 
through a process of sensemaking that is influenced by the events and cues that they pick up from the 
environment around them, past experiences, identity processes, social relations (potential decoupling of 
evidence and understandings). Third, these understandings are embedded in narratives, influenced by 
inherited traditions (Bevir and Rhodes, 2008: 171), and reinforced by the outputs of the very decision-
making dynamics that they contribute to shape (sensemaking is enactive of sensible environments).  
To develop these arguments, the paper adopts an actor-centred constructivist approach and 
investigates decision-making dynamics by applying insights from framing theories and sensemaking 
approaches. The paper applies the approach developed to the case of Sicily, a powerful and counter-
intuitive case that demonstrates the value of the broader conceptual and methodological claim made. 
Sicily has been centrally and crucially affected by the refugee crisis: after 2015 it became the main 
European “gateway” for asylum-seeking migration, and its reception centres, at the peak of the crisis, 
hosted the highest number of asylum-seekers in Italy (Ministry of Interior, 2018). It has also experienced 
an increase in anti-migrant attitudes and in the salience of the migration issue. Despite that, as this paper 
will show, it experienced very low levels of political contestation of migration, and these distinctive 
dynamics of politicisation are largely based on actors’ beliefs. 
                                                     
* The research from which these findings are derived was funded by the European Research Council for the project ‘Prospects 
for International Migration Governance’ (no. 340430) awarded to Professor Andrew Geddes. 
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The paper begins by developing its theoretical approach and conceptual claims. It then justifies case 
selection and illustrates why Sicily is a puzzling and revealing case. This is then followed by a section 
that shows migration not to be the object of negative political contestation in Sicily, despite objective 
indicators suggesting that it should be. The subsequent section uses material from 41 semi-structured 
interviews conducted in May 2018 to unpick decision-making processes, to show how meanings are 
constitutive of the actions/inactions of political actors in Sicily, and thus to illustrate the drivers of these 
unexpected dynamics of politicisation in the region. 
Opening the “black box” of the politicisation process 
Politicization means “making collectively binding decisions an object of public discussion” (Zurn, 2012: 
50). It is generally understood as a multi-dimensional concept (Grande et al., 2018: 2) which combines 
salience (the visibility of the issue) and polarization (the existence of conflicting views).  
The existing literature on the politicisation of migration almost exclusively focuses on these visible 
and measurable “outputs”, such as shifts in party positions on immigration and the political conflict 
during electoral campaigns. Taking these outputs as dependent variables, many scholars have examined 
causal relationships with the aim to identify their main “drivers” (Grande et al., 2018). The process of 
construction of immigration as a public issue is thus generally understood as the result of the interplay 
between multiple factors. At least three different strands can be identified in this scholarship, which 
focus, respectively, on: socio-economic variables such as migration patterns, models of integration and 
the unemployment rate (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017; Van der Brug et al. 2015); public attitudes on 
immigration and issue salience (Gilligan, 2015; Castelli Gattinara, 2017); and issue entrepreneurship by 
radical right parties or moderate centre-right parties (Van Spanje 2010; Hobolt and De Vries, 2015; 
Meyer and Rosenberger, 2015; Grande et al. 2018).  
Decision-making processes, instead, are largely neglected by these scholarly works. Scholars from 
all these strands, in fact, tend to extrapolate back from these observed outputs of the politicisation 
process mere assumptions about the reasoning of political actors, under the conviction that “strategic 
considerations are less relevant in this domain than in others” (Abou-Chadi and Helbling, 2018: 700). 
Therefore, following an increase in migration flows and issue salience, radical right parties are assumed 
to adopt issue entrepreneurship strategies. Mainstream parties, on the other hand, are assumed to be 
prompted or to be forced to modify their positions on migration – “whether they like it or not” (ibid.) – 
in response to increasing migration flows, concerns expressed by the populations, and the pressure from 
the far-right (Gianfreda, 2017; Vranceanu, 2017).  
While these considerations are evidently plausible, I argue that making assumptions about the nature 
of a process by extrapolating back from its outputs is problematic from an analytical and methodological 
point of view. Brunsson (1985) showed the scope for the presence of complex and often contradictory 
pressures to which parties must try to respond and that are not necessarily evident in the outcome of 
policy processes (Boswell and Geddes, 2011). These pressures might be due to both material and 
ideational factors. Particularly in situations of crisis, actors’ interpretations of the effects of external 
environments powerfully drive decision-making preferences, often leading to the decoupling of 
problems and choices in the political process (Cohen et al., 1972). 
This paper focuses on this “missing middle” to shed light on the question of how actors’ 
understandings of the effects of migration flows and of public reactions to such flows are formed, and 
how they shape or influence dynamics of political contestation of migration. The paper thus reverses the 
traditional analytical focus of the existing literature and, rather than examining outputs, adopts a 
constructivist actor-centred perspective focused on decision-making processes, and, more specifically, 
on how actors frame problems, make sense of the situation around them and make decisions on how to 
act upon these understandings. 
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To do so, I will focus on both actors’ understandings and the political context in which they operate 
(Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 4). Actors’ understandings of the consequences of migration flows and of 
public reactions to these flows necessarily drive actors’ strategies (Pierre, 2000), forming the basis for 
an answer to the two key questions – “what is going on?” and “what should be done next?” – that actors 
face when they have to define their course of action in situations of crisis. The social and political context 
in which actors operate plays a key role in influencing how these understandings are developed and 
processed to shape actions. I assume, therefore, that actors are both “situated agents” (ibid.) – whose 
cognitive understandings and context for action are shaped by social, historical, political and 
organisational settings – and “strategic actors”, who have a certain capacity to shape and influence the 
context in which they operate with their decisions (Hay, 2002: 128). 
To investigate actors’ individual purposive actions, their cognitive micro-foundations, and their 
impact on party elites’ strategies, I draw concepts and ideas from the framing perspective and the 
sensemaking approach, two largely separate literatures, both of which have addressed the cognitive 
process by which the meaning of events is constructed, negotiated and translated into action.  
While framing theories are often applied in political science, I specifically focus on cognitive frames 
rather than frames in communication (Scheufele, 1999: 106), in other words, I focus on the “micro” 
individual cognitive dimension of the framing process to extrapolate the set of dimensions that drive 
individuals’ processing of information and understanding of events. The sensemaking approach, 
conversely, has been mostly developed in organizational studies (Weick, 1995; 2001) and emphasizes 
the social psychological and epistemological processes by which actors form an understanding of the 
situations they find themselves in and assign meaning to novel, unexpected or confusing events (Helms 
Mills et al., 2010: 183). Applying concepts and ideas from this second approach seems particularly 
relevant to investigate actors’ strategies in the context of the refugee crisis: sensemaking, indeed, is 
specifically salient in situations of ambiguity or uncertainty, when a personal jolt, shock or break of 
routine, violating expectancies, requires individuals to develop some sort of sense regarding what they 
are up against, what their own position is relative to what they sense, and what they need to do (Weick, 
1995).  
According to Bird and Osland (2005: 125), framing and sensemaking are ontologically and 
methodologically compatible. Following their contributions to the literature on organizational studies, 
indeed, sensemaking can be conceptualised as an ongoing process involving an iterative cycle of 
sequential events: (1) framing the situation, (2) making attributions or assigning meaning to this 
situation, and (3) selecting a script that, based on the frames and attributions adopted, guides actions. 
Applying these two approaches together, I argue, allows to shed light on the question of how 
understandings about migration and public attitudes on migration are formed and acted upon, and of the 
impact of these processes on the politicisation of migration (Figure 1). 
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The approach developed is applied to the case of the Italian region of Sicily, a powerful heuristic case 
(Eckstein, 1973), selected for its high explanatory value, which allows to illustrate the value of the 
broader conceptual and methodological claim illustrated so far. 
This region, I argue, represents a highly puzzling and revealing case. On the one hand, the existing 
literature suggests that, at least until 2014, migration in the region was not politicised, indeed. 
Traditionally, Sicilian politicians did not show any inclination to exploit anti-migrant fears for electoral 
gain (Cole, 1997: 124). Bassi (2014: 60) reports that, before the refugee crisis, immigration was not a 
prevailing concern on the Sicilian regional agenda, unlike in other regions.  
On the other hand, at least four elements would suggest the emergence of dynamics there that, 
according to the assumptions of the existing literature, should lead to high levels of political contestation 
of migration.  
First, the region’s exposure to migration flows. Sicilian harbours became, since 2014, the main 
European “gateway” for asylum-seeking migration, and the region hosted the highest number of asylum-
seekers in Italy, including half of the thousands of unaccompanied minors that landed in the country 
(Ministry of Interior, 2018). Asylum-seekers were dispersed throughout the region and reception centres 
were often created in rural areas, characterised by high unemployment and a stagnant economy harshly 
hit by the economic crisis. In 2017, more than 5,000 asylum-seekers were hosted in the “CARA di 
Mineo”, a huge reception centre in a village in the province of Catania, with around 5,000 inhabitants. 
Second, public reactions to these flows, a key factor leading to the politicisation of migration, 
according to the literature. Data from the last Eurobarometer, indeed, suggest that in 2018 the salience 
Decision-Making Processes and the (Non) Politicisation of Migration in Sicily 
European University Institute 5 
of migration in Sicily was significantly high (23 per cent of respondents mentioned immigration as their 
first issue of concern, according to Il Sole 24 Ore1). Furthermore, other polls suggest that Sicilians 
express more negative sentiments towards migrants compared to people living in the Centre and North 
of Italy (Genovese et al., 2016: 9; Dennison, 2018), a trend that can be explained by both macro-
economic factors (high unemployment and low income, leading to a higher labour market competition) 
and the presence of large Home Office centres such as the “CARA di Mineo” (Genovese et al., 2016). 
Ambrosini (2018: 119-121) and other sources2 also suggest that migrants have been the target of a 
number of protests and xenophobic attacks. 
Third, the many scandals around asylum management in Sicily, which received wide coverage in 
both local and national media. The recent history of the region, in fact, has been marked by frequent 
scandals concerning the management of reception centres, often created as profit-driven businesses 
rather than providers of aid (Manzano et al., 2018: 83), the infiltration of the organized crime in the 
reception system (Massey, 2015: 24), and “media outrages on the living conditions of migrants” 
(D’Angelo, 2018: 2). Importantly, twenty interviews conducted, as part of a wider study (Pettrachin, 
forthcoming), with high level officials in the Ministry of Interior and national politicians in early 2018 
revealed that these scandals powerfully influenced these actors’ understandings of the refugee crisis and, 
ultimately, their strategies or policy choices. 
Fourth, the very high political variation within Sicily – suggesting the potential for the adoption by 
parties of strategies of issue-differentiation – and the presence of strong and deeply rooted far right 
party, Fratelli d’Italia. After 2011, in fact, Sicily has been characterized by both extreme electoral 
volatility between one election and the other, and a significant instability of preferences in elections of 
different types (Cerruto and Raniolo, 2018: 419). Electors in the region for decades had massively 
supported moderate or conservative centre-right parties, but after 2011 their popularity started to 
decrease. The region became the main stronghold of the protest party Movimento Cinque Stelle, which 
after 2012 was the leading party at all regional and national elections but did not manage to win the 
governorship nor a significant number of municipalities (Figure 2). The regional government was 
controlled by the centre-left until 2017 and, then, by the centre-right coalition, with a strong far right 
component, mainly represented by the post-fascist Fratelli d’Italia. The far-right Lega was totally alien 
to the regional context but started to gain some consensus in the region after Salvini decided to get rid 
of its traditional anti-southernism and turned it into a nationalist far-right party. The very high number 
of mayors not affiliated to the main parties in Figure 2, finally, is a sign of the personalisation of local 
Sicilian politics. This is particularly evident in small municipalities, where mayors tend to turn into 
powerful gatekeepers that can provide political favours to citizens in exchange of votes (Parisi and 
Pasquino, 1977).  
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Figure 2. Number of Sicilian municipalities led by different parties in late 2017 (source: 
www.comuniverso.it) 
 
These four considerations suggest the potential for an increasing politicisation of migration in Sicily. 
The rest of this paper will therefore investigate, first, whether in fact the refugee crisis led to an increased 
political contestation of migration in Sicily and, secondly, how actors’ understandings and decision-
making processes influenced the politicisation process. The analysis draws on an extensive document 
analysis and on 41 semi-structured interviews conducted in May 2018 (see Tables A1 and A2 in the 
annex), across three geographical areas: North-Eastern Sicily (Messina, Catania), South-Eastern Sicily 
(Ragusa, Siracusa) and Western Sicily (Palermo, Trapani). As shown in Table A2, the sample includes 
party-actors from across the whole political spectrum.  
The Diverse Politicisation of Migration in Sicily 
This section shows that, despite the increase in flows, salience and public awareness, most party-actors 
in Sicily, until 2018, did not politicise migration. To reach this conclusion, I focus on the two elements 
that, following Zurn (2012: 51) and Grande et al. (2018: 7), define political contestation, namely issue 
salience, intended here as the visibility of immigration issue in relation to other issues in an election 
campaign, and polarization, i.e. the positional variance between parties on the immigration issue.  
To assess issue salience, I develop a content analysis of manifestoes of mayoral candidates at the 
2018 local elections in 14 Sicilian municipalities (Table 1), and of presidential candidates at the 2017 
regional elections (Table 2). The use of party manifesto data to study the politicization of migration is 
common in the existing literature (Grande et al., 2018: 7) and it is assumed that they provide reliable 
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Table 1. Number of electoral manifestoes that mention migration - Local Elections, 20183 (in bold: 
municipalities hosting reception centres; in Italics: municipalities hosting SPRAR centres) 
 
 




                                                     
3 In 2018 local elections in Sicily were held in 137 municipalities. This selected sample includes all provincial capitals where 
elections were held and a representative number of towns and villages, randomly selected in order to keep a balance between 
geographical areas, number of inhabitants, number of asylum-seekers hosted and type of reception centres.  
Table 3. Electoral Manifestoes that Mention Migration - Regional Elections, November 2017.  
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 Messina 5 1 3 1 
Catania 5 4 1 0 
Siracusa 7 4 2 1 
Ragusa 7 5 1 1 






Modica (RG) 4 1 2 1 
Mascalucia (CT) 4 3 1 0 
Carlentini (SR) 5 5 0 0 







Valderice (TP) 3 3 0 0 
Santa Domenica (ME) 2 2 0 0 
Francofonte (SR) 4 3 0 1 
Acate (RG) 3 0 2 1 
Mineo (CT) 3 3 0 0 
TOTAL 60 41 12 7 
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The analysis clearly suggests that most party-actors tend not to politicise migration. In the provincial 
capitals, 7 of the 27 manifestoes, mainly from left-wing or centre-left candidates, frame migration in 
positive terms, while only four frame its effects negatively: two candidates exclusively supported by the 
Lega (who both gained less than 2 percent of the votes), and two (non-elected) candidates of the centre-
right coalition supported by the Lega. The inclusion of anti-migrant frames in these latter manifestoes, 
according to local media, was imposed by the Lega as a condition for the party’s support to those 
candidates4. The Lega, therefore, emerges as the only party that attempts to inject anti-migrant frames 
into the local debate. 
In towns and villages, only 8 manifestoes mention migration (3 of them frame its effects in negative 
terms) despite most of the selected municipalities hosting SPRAR reception centres directly managed 
by local governments. Even in Mineo, the village that hosted the biggest reception centre in Europe, 
none of the three manifestoes advocated closure or partial emptying of the centre.  
The interview material confirms this finding. Most of the interviewees stated that they could not 
remember any debate or discussion on immigration during recent local or regional electoral campaigns. 
As an interviewee explains: 
If I think about local and regional electoral campaigns in the last two years, I have never heard any 
statement on immigration. I remember the last local electoral campaign in Pozzallo in 2017, where 
you would say immigration could have been a very salient issue, and rather it was a topic that was 
never mentioned, nobody spoke about it (Director of a local research centre). 
The only candidates that are reported to speak about immigration during electoral campaigns are 
progressive candidates in the main cities, such as the Mayor of Palermo Orlando who, according to a 
centre-left MP, declared during the final rally of his campaign in 2017 that “whoever lives in Palermo 
is a Palermitan citizen, no matter where he comes from”. Importantly, while the Lega’s attempts to 
politicise immigration are perceived as a shock to the system by some interviewees, others play down 
their effects: 
The Lega gained some votes at the last national elections, but its members in Sicily are not conveyors 
of the typical ideas of the Lega on immigration, they are old politicians coming from other parties 
(…). If you speak with them or read what they say, you’ll never find any public statement about 
migration (Deputy Prefect). 
To assess polarization in the Sicilian political system, instead, I rely on the interview material and 
develop a manual frame analysis of actors’ responses to questions investigating their perception of the 
effects of recent migration flows in their municipality and region. Findings are detailed in Table 3 below. 
The table suggests that at least three different perspectives on migration coexist in the Sicilian political 
system. A first restricted group of actors includes six mayors and deputy mayors of provincial capitals 
or port towns, who adopt multiculturalist frames and describe the effects of migration in very positive 
terms. The vast majority of actors, instead, refuse to frame the effects of migrant flows per se in negative 
or positive terms. Rather, they adopt “administrative frames” – putting a strong emphasis on the negative 
problems caused by the inefficient management of asylum – or circumscribe the effects of flows to the 
realm of people’s perceptions or do not identify any relevant effect of immigration in their 
municipalities. Finally, a third group of actors – including two mayors of villages that hosted big 
reception centres, two MPs from centre-right parties with previous affiliations to the far right MSI/AN, 
and an independent mayor affiliated to the Lega – tend to adopt securitised or threat frames and describe 
the effects of migration in very negative terms (although none of them used identitarian or nativist 
frames, as might have been expected given the strong anti-migrant positions of these parties). 
Despite the existence of divergent views, importantly, the table reveals that actors’ political 
affiliation cannot predict the frames adopted. Table 3 indicates, indeed, that some of the interviewees 
                                                     
4 https://www.ragusaoggi.it/la-lega-appoggera-la-candidatura-a-sindaco-di-maurizio-tumino-confronto-con-il-vertice-
siciliano/ 
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affiliated to centre-right or right-wing parties adopt administrative or even multiculturalist frames. This 
finding is confirmed by an analysis of media interviews released by the leaders of these parties in the 
island. The right-wing President of the Region Nello Musumeci, close to Fratelli d’Italia, and the 
President of the Regional Council and leader of Forza Italia Gianfranco Micciché, for instance, never 
adopted anti-migrant frames in public and even expressed pro-migrant positions5. Remarkably, the right-
wing mayor of Mazara del Vallo (an important port town close to Trapani), member of Fratelli d’Italia, 
became known as one of the strongest advocates of multiculturalism and cross-Mediterranean 
connections in the region despite its right-wing party being known for xenophobic nationalism (Giglioli, 
2017: 758). As the director of a local research centre interviewed puts it: 
The political debate on immigration in Sicily is messy and confused (…). I mean, it’s not possible 
to identify clear differences in party approaches to immigration, they have very mixed positions. 
You can find a left-wing administration which is very hostile towards migrants and a very open-
minded mayor from Fratelli d’Italia. 
Importantly, when asked about the position they adopted in debates about immigration during recent 
electoral campaigns, the five interviewees that adopt securitised frames also replied that the issue was 
not at the core of the manifesto of their party. No reference to immigration, in fact, can be identified in 
their social media pages. As one of them states, “this matter cannot be a topic of discussion in electoral 
campaigns, because it is strictly under the competence of the national government, mayoral candidates 
must explain how they plan to solve the problems of their municipality” (centre-right MP).  
To sum up, most party actors adopt ambiguous stances while describing the effects of migration in 
Sicily and do not politicise migration. A few centre-right actors do adopt securitised frames but do not 
act to politicise the issue. Finally, in contrast with a well-established finding in the politicisation 
literature (Green-Pedersen and Otjes, 2017; Grande et al., 2018 etc.), it is not right-wing actors but, 
rather, a number of mayors of the main provincial capitals and port towns that act as issue entrepreneurs, 
i.e. actors that “actively promote a previously ignored issue and adopt a position which is different from 
the mean position in the party system” (Hobolt and De Vries, 2015: 1161). These mayors adopt 
multiculturalist frames and thus promote an unusual type of “positive politicisation” of migration in the 
region. 
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Table 3. Frame Analysis: How Interviewees Frame the Effects of Asylum-Seeking Migration in their City or Region (CR=centre-right politician; 
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Why is migration not the object of (negative) political contestation in Sicily?  
How can we explain the distinctive dynamics of politicisation of migration in Sicily, which are contrary 
to the expectations derived from the three main strands of the politicisation literature? To address this 
question, I identify an overarching narrative that seems to influence most actors’ understandings and 
then show how the three groups of party-actors identified above make sense of the situation around them 
and define their strategies and positions on migration.  
The “Sicilian Theory” 
The interview material crucially reveals that evidence about public attitudes on migration in Sicily is 
strongly embedded in a narrative story: most party-actors’ understandings of public reactions to recent 
flows are powerfully influenced by inclusive identity-processes and what Jeffrey Cole in 1997 defined 
as “the prevalence of preconceptions about Sicilian tolerance among the local intelligentsia”.  
Many of the actors interviewed, indeed, referred to Sicily's multicultural past and its position at the 
crossroads of Mediterranean history as a key element that influenced their responses to the refugee crisis. 
The point is illustrated by the following quotes: 
We Sicilians are the product of migration flows, from and to this island, across all the dominations 
that we experienced in history. Therefore, we are ready for asylum-seekers’ reception, we believe 
in this reception and in multiculturalism (Deputy Mayor, Independent). 
I think what determined Sicily’s response [to the crisis] is its history and culture, which is built on 
the capacity to open itself up to the world outside. Sicily is at the centre of the Mediterranean, it 
couldn’t have been different (Deputy Mayor, PD). 
I really couldn’t have an instinct to shut myself away, because I really love the Sicilian culture and 
history. We melted with Arabs, Greeks, Romans, they all left us something, and they all taught us 
something (MP, centre-left, previously M5S).  
Our history and our culture help us making the right decisions (Mayor, centre-right). 
Importantly, this narrative is proposed also by actors affiliated to centre-right or right-wing parties. The 
right-wing President of the Region, Nello Musumeci, declared in 2018, that “there is no racism in Sicily, 
a land which has been dominated by fifteen different foreign populations, and is used to coexist 
peacefully with people from other cultures”6. The right-wing mayor of Mazara del Vallo explained, 
during a media interview, that in his town “there are no tensions between different communities, since 
centuries Jews, Muslims and Christians live in the same territory and they respect each other, we did 
nothing more than going further along the same lines”7.  
The experience of nearly a century of emigration from the region also seems to powerfully influence 
actors’ understandings. Nine interviewees referred to Sicilian emigration as an element that powerfully 
shaped their view of recent migration flows. As a PD Mayor puts it:  
I’m a politician since many years and I have a political view of the current migration flows. But I 
make no secret that I also have a personal view, influenced by the fact that I have relatives that have 
been migrants. They had harsh troubles at the beginning (…), I know what “reception” in a foreign 
country meant to them. Therefore, it’s very easy for me to understand the reasons why these migrants 
come here…they are forced to. We have been a people of migration too (Mayor, PD). 
Crucially, this prevailing narrative on Sicilian tolerance tends to be projected by most interviewees to 
the entire Sicilian population: 
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Sicilian citizens have always been super welcoming, because of their history and culture, they are 
used to share their land with other populations and they are open to different cultures (…) and this 
explains why recent migration flows have not been really suffered here (MP, M5S).  
We have a history of absorbing outsiders, having been dominated throughout the ages by Romans, 
Arabs, Byzantines and Normans, and the city is deeply catholic. The combination of these two 
elements make of Palermo a very welcoming city, a city that cannot be easily affected by racism 
(centre-left MP). 
“I was elected mayor with a victory of 74 percent. That means people think I’m right. There is no 
intolerance in the stomach of the people, it’s only in politicians’ minds” (Leoluca Orlando, Mayor 
of Palermo, interview released to The Guardian, 2018) 
A deputy mayor from the M5S explains that “being welcoming towards newcomers is in Sicilians’ 
DNA”, while an independent deputy mayor explains that “our people accepted the idea that the future 
of this city is that of being a multicultural city”.  
Furthermore, this model tends to contrast the acceptance of Southern Italian with the intolerance of 
Northern Italians. At least four interviewees suggest that the experience of marginality and 
stigmatization endured by Southern Italians, particularly in the North of Italy, necessarily fosters a 
compassionate understanding for asylum-seekers. As a former MP puts it: 
Especially in Northern Italy, we Sicilians have suffered what asylum-seekers are suffering now. 
Until a few decades ago, in Bolzano, just to give you an example from a personal experience in my 
family, they didn’t rent houses to Sicilians, even if they had an employment contract, even if they 
were very nice people, with children (centre-left MP, previously M5S).  
A PD Deputy Mayor and a centre-right Mayor are even more explicit in pointing to the concentration 
of anti-immigrant politics and intolerance in the North by way of contrast to Sicilian tolerance: 
Once, in a meeting with other mayors I said that “talking about reception and solidarity is very nice 
but putting them into practice is different”. They talked about solidarity but then 20 or 30 asylum-
seekers were sent to a big city in the North and they raised hell. Here, we have put the principles of 
reception and solidarity into practice (PD Deputy Mayor).  
This eagerness to compare oneself favourably with the North, to address and avenge unjust treatment 
and characterizations, seems to be an example of what Cole defines as the “ongoing Sicilian reaction to 
anti-southernism in Italian politics and culture” (1997: 101). It also shows how immigration discourses 
in Sicily develop “in relation to internal forms of ‘othering’ of southern Italians” (Giglioli, 2017: 749). 
Importantly, all these accounts are at odds with existing data on public attitudes on migration, 
suggesting that most of the Sicilian population perceive migrants as a burden and that the issue is more 
salient than this narrative would suggest. This seems to support Cole’s “Sicilian thesis” (1997: 101), 
according to which Sicily’s history and culture, and the long experience of emigration, “would explain 
the acceptance of migrants there, or should justify such acceptance if it did not already exist”. The 
Sicilian political elite, in other words, recalling the emigrant experience and the history of Arab and 
Norman civilization in Sicily, would ground the acceptance of migrants in historical precedent and “give 
local resonance to abstract formulations of anti-racism and diversity” (ibid.: 132). In Cole’s words “a 
powerful and satisfying, if insinuating and destructive, ‘commonsense’ can and does emerge from a 
fusion of ideologies” (ibid.).  
These dynamics seem consistent with well-established findings in the literature on sensemaking. 
According to Weick, sensemaking is grounded in identity construction (1995: 18) and identities are 
constructed through interactions with others: “what outsiders think we are and how they treat us 
stabilizes or destabilizes our identity” (Weick et al., 2005: 416). Also, they clearly indicate that the 
opportunity for sensemaking is provided by retrospection: individuals rely on familiar past experiences 
and the factors that have shaped their lives to make sense and interpret current events (Helms Mills et 
al., 2010: 184). 
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Pro-migrant narratives in the main Sicilian cities and port towns 
Mayors of the main Sicilian cities and port towns that adopt multiculturalist frames and actively inject 
them into the public arena are particularly sensitive to the narrative on Sicilian tolerance. Their 
continuous invocation of Sicilian culture and history seems to seek making more evocative their general 
calls for tolerance, with the defining experience of past Sicilian emigration constituting the moral basis 
that they use for the enactment of this ‘commonsense’ in the present. The interview material reveals that 
this pre-existing perception is reinforced by several focusing events, indicators, personal experiences, 
and feedback, which, as suggested by the sensemaking literature, all play a key role in influencing how 
the interviewees assess the situation around them (Kingdon, 2014: 113). 
One of these indicators seems to be the presence of a very active and strong civil society, particularly 
in big cities. In a context where most party-actors refrain from politicising migration, indeed, the politics 
of migration is mostly left to associations, NGOs and Christian churches, which ultimately play a crucial 
role in the local immigration policy-making (Bassi, 2014: 62). While most of the interviewees welcome 
the role played these NGOs, the four city deputy mayors interviewed admitted that these actors created 
significant (and, sometimes, uncomfortable) pressures to which they had to respond: 
As a Deputy Mayor responsible for immigration policies, I had of course to deal with the opposition 
of the Lega in the Council (…) but I mostly had to deal with pro-migrant activists, for whom the 
administration was not doing enough for the asylum-seekers. Sometimes they had very destructive 
attitudes, some of them tend to always perceive the institutions as something that must be contrasted, 
regardless of who is leading them and what they are doing (…). I could also perceive a strong 
competition between them, with the result that all of them tried to be in the limelight (…). And they 
consider you responsible of what the central government does, as if you were not doing enough to 
contrast them (Independent Deputy Mayor).  
We experienced some pressures, but they were coming from the civil society, from the NGOs, not 
from public opinion in general. Public opinion did not exert any significant pressure on this issue, 
while some of the NGOs did (PD Deputy Mayor).  
Another element that seems to have influenced these actors’ understandings is the direct experience of 
assisting migrants’ landing process. This strong personal experience is mentioned by all mayors of 
provincial capitals and port towns as something that powerfully influenced their understandings. A 
Deputy Mayor from the M5S and the mayor of a port village referred both to their involvement in the 
process of distribution and to the burial of the bodies of migrants who died during the journey as a really 
shocking experience. The Deputy Mayor explains that “it was really heart-breaking, at the end I thought, 
none of us can choose the place where we were born, and therefore how can we not receive these 
people?”. The mayor of the port village explains that what he saw reminded him of the pictures of the 
victims of Nazi concentration camps.  
Finally, the wider European and Italian context also seems to contribute to activate these identity 
processes. The interview material reveals, indeed, that, without any constraint from public opinion, these 
mayors seem to think that the refugee crisis offers an opportunity to develop pro-migrant discourses that 
are also aimed, strategically, at “branding of difference” (Catungal and Leslie, 2009) and promoting a 
new image of their cities. Giglioli (2017: 758) explains that the Mayor of Mazara del Vallo started to 
formally celebrate the multicultural status of the town with the aim to rebrand it as a tourist destination 
and strategic location for cross-Mediterranean relations. The Mayor of Palermo, interviewed by CNBC8, 
declared that “there is no city in the world that changed so deeply and widely like Palermo: in the last 
40 years we went through a tremendous change, we started from being the capital of mafia to being the 
capital of human rights”. A PD Deputy Mayor interviewed explained that he thinks “the refugee crisis 
is an opportunity for Sicily and its cities, to show their capacity to be open to the world, and to be an 
example for others”. An independent deputy mayor adds: 
                                                     
8 https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/28/italy-election-immigration-is-seen-as-a-key-issue-in-sicily.html 
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We proposed a model that we want to offer to others (…) The vice-president of the German 
parliament went to Palermo to discuss the “Charter of Palermo” and understand what it means. 
Palermo won a Special Prize as “Smart City IBM” thanks to it. In New York they asked themselves, 
how is it possible that these Sicilian people, that everybody perceives as being invaded by migrants, 
rather than complaining because they are facing an invasion, tell migrants “come, and we will try to 
develop some reception programmes”? Therefore, they used their time to understand what we were 
doing, they came to Sicily, they spent one month in Palermo to understand how this model could be 
exported elsewhere (Independent Deputy Mayor).  
A similar logic seems to apply to the main port villages and towns, although in this case the decision to 
adopt pro-migrant narratives seems to be, at least partly, a defensive strategy, to preserve the image of 
the municipalities as touristic destinations. As a Mayor explains: 
I really think that recent flows enriched the town from a cultural and social point of view. The only 
problem we have is that media tend to portray this town as invaded by migrants. It’s not like this, 
local people don’t even realise if some migrants are landed in the port, but these media campaigns 
harm us, because we live of tourism (Mayor of port village).  
Therefore, ultimately, these attributions shape these actors’ strategies and decisions. This explains the 
frequent use of pro-migrant frames in public speeches and rallies, and the launch of innovative human 
rights documents such as the Charter of Palermo, stating that “mobility must be recognized as an 
inalienable human right”. Orlando even asked the competent national authorities to start using the port 
of Palermo to land rescued migrants and personally welcomed them in the port9. Coherent with this 
script is also the development of initiatives to export the “Sicilian model” abroad: the mayors of the 
main Sicilian cities and port towns were frequently invited to give speeches at foreign institutions and 
universities10, to release interviews to international newspapers11 and became popular abroad for their 
pro-migrant positions. 
Outside the Main Cities: Asylum-Seekers’ Reception as a Source of Job Opportunities? 
As shown in Table 3, most of the party-actors interviewed – including MPs and mayors of small or 
medium-size municipalities – refuse to frame the effects of migration in Sicily either in positive or in 
negative terms. These actors’ ambiguous stances, I argue, are revealing of Hall’s concept of “deliberate 
malintegration” (1984). This concept suggests that actors involved in designing migration policies – 
which are often the object of a range of competing (mainly economic) interests – tend to develop 
strategies that are reflective “of an intentional jumble, or ‘fudging’, of different goals and priorities” 
(Geddes and Boswell, 2011), and that can therefore appear quite inconsistent or contradictory.  
Differently from the mayors of the main cities, interviewees in rural Sicily, on the one hand, seem to 
perceive a stronger hostility from the local population towards migrants, due to the perceived 
competition in the bottom of the segmented labour market (especially in agriculture). Furthermore, many 
interviewees thus report that locals complain that immigrants receive the government attention they also 
deserve but cannot get. As two mayors put it: 
Part of the population does not understand the complexity of the phenomenon, and the responsibility 
is of politicians and of the national governments, because their hostility depends on the absence of 
welfare policies that could support families that are in need. What the underclass, in inverted 
commas, asks to the local administrations is the opportunity to be supported and granted a basic 
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income, and each time they make this request, they say, in Sicilian dialect, “to the blacks yes, to the 
whites no” (M5S Mayor) 
Here, the locals don’t say that they don’t want asylum-seekers, they say that they must be integrated, 
that they should work and have a house. But they say they should also have all this. This is the key 
concept: why them and not me? Why the welfare system is so generous towards migrants but not 
towards locals? (PD Mayor) 
On the other hand, interviewees in small economically struggling municipalities, seem to be much more 
aware of the economic benefits linked to asylum-seekers’ reception (which in bigger and wealthier 
municipalities are less noticed and less needed). As a consequence of that, part of the population is 
perceived by most of these actors (including the mayor affiliated to the Lega) to be supportive or tolerant 
towards migrants’ reception because of the opportunities of business or employment offered by asylum-
seekers’ reception. The mayor of a village that finally decided not to accept the Prefect’s proposal to 
host some asylum-seekers explains that “part of the population, in fact a minority, sees the potential 
creation of a reception centre as an opportunity of local development for our municipality and to create 
jobs”. As another right-wing mayor puts it: 
Asylum-seekers reception became an opportunity for several service providers. Initially they were 
single centres, then the importance of asylum-seekers’ reception grew up in the local economy. Of 
course, I don’t think that this can or should represent a model of local development for this province, 
but actually it is a sector of the economy that can offer some responses to the very high 
unemployment that is a huge problem here (Mayor, right-wing).  
Overall, local public opinion is thus perceived by most interviewees in Sicilian towns and villages as 
split between those that oppose immigration, for economic reasons rather than for identitarian or security 
reasons, and those that support asylum-seekers’ reception for ideological reasons (a perception partly 
influenced by preconceptions on Sicilian tolerance) or because of the economic benefits associated to 
it. These elements seem to produce an enduring tension between the opportunity to offer employment 
to locals and, on the other hand, the fear of the negative reaction of the population. As a mayor explains: 
The choice [to create or not a reception centre] is a difficult one. Clearly this sector is a source of 
job opportunities that we didn’t have before (…). But overall, on the one hand we had an increase 
of high-skilled labour demand thanks to the SPRAR centres, on the other hand probably we had job 
losses in agriculture, since many asylum-seekers are now employed and exploited by local 
employers in the countryside (Mayor, M5S).  
While these opposite pressures seem to emerge in the whole region, they seem to lead to different 
outcomes in different areas. In the little village of Mineo these pressures turned into harsh conflicts 
among locals. The village (with around 5,000 inhabitants), isolated in a mountainous area in the province 
of Catania, hosted the biggest reception centre of Europe (the so-called “CARA di Mineo”), with more 
than 5,000 asylum-seekers at the peak of the refugee crisis. On the one hand, the concentration of so 
many asylum-seekers in one single centre, according to several interviewees, created harsh problems of 
law and order. On the other hand, the centre offered jobs to hundreds of locals, in an area characterised 
by high unemployment and emigration rates. As two interviewees from the area explain, this situation 
led to harsh tensions among the “fortunate” and the “victims”: 
The presence of the CARA generated in Mineo a mechanism of self-destruction. Because here the 
emigration rate is high, many young people have to leave, and their parents were ready to do 
everything in order for this not to happen. Therefore, when they knew that their neighbours’ son got 
a job in the CARA, they became extremely jealous and started fighting against each other, with 
lawsuits, denunciations and whatever. There has been a never-ending war, with citizens one against 
the other, which has powerfully destabilized the village (…). At some point all the town councillors 
from the opposition resigned, because the contrasts we experienced on this issue have been 
unbelievable (Mayor, centre-right). 
Security is a relevant problem. The employment opportunities that asylum-seekers’ reception offers 
can become a negative factor if they become speculative, sectarian or dominated by a patronage 
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system. What happened in Mineo is that we had a group of citizens that found a job and were fully 
realised, while others lived it as an additional injustice (Mayor, PD). 
In such a situation – and despite forensic evidence that members of the Rome-based gang “Mafia 
Capitale” had bribed senior local authority and political officials in Rome to award maintenance 
contracts for the CARA to criminal associates and to divert migrants from other centres to Mineo – most 
party-actors decided not to take any position on the CARA in the wake of the local elections of 2018. 
Quite significantly, none of the three mayoral candidates included in the manifesto any significant 
statement on the CARA, motivating this decision by the fact that the local administration has no 
competences on the management of the centre. 
In the rest of the region the underlying tension between the economic opportunities offered by 
migrants’ reception and the perceived negative consequences on the local population remained more 
latent and forced mayors to make decisions on the creation of reception centres by balancing the different 
interests at stake. Sometimes, especially in little villages or when they perceived a strong opposition by 
locals, mayors decided not to support the creation of reception centres. In other cases, actors’ perception 
that locals’ hostility was unlikely to lead to anti-migrant protests led them to accept or even informally 
promote the creation of reception centres. When this happened, they seemed very careful not to make 
the decision appear to be open, a matter of choice, something that is decided upon and that therefore 
entails responsibility (Buzan et al., 1997: 29).  
Some interviewees, particularly from the civil society, suggest that these decisions are significantly 
influenced by the possibility that reception centres offer to develop new patronage relationships. As 
the head of a service provider puts it:  
Mayors are willing to create reception centres because, in a context of economic stagnation, these 
centres can offer jobs to several people. This is always a key element of their decisions. And I don’t 
think this is scandalous per se, it is part of the effects of migration flows in broader terms, the fact 
that they have the potential to radically transform a socio-economic context (…). Some local 
administrations understood that, although, to be honest, for most of them the only element that 
matters is the opportunity to offer jobs to locals in a clientelist manner. This component is very 
strong. And very often it gets mixed with a genuine tendency to be welcoming with migrants. 
Everything is complex in Sicily, it is never black and white (Coordinator of a Service Provider).  
To sum up, these actors’ ambiguous stances and strategies of issue avoidance are linked to their 
perception of these competing interests. As a regional MP explains:  
Immigration is a very slippery slope, from a political point of view. When you openly speak about 
this topic, you know that by doing that you disappoint some and you please others. Therefore, 
typically, you tend not to take side, or to only refer to the national level, avoiding linking the issue 
to the regional level (…). Nobody speaks about that, and the reason is that everybody realises that 
this is a very slippery slope, where you can be perceived as a racist populist or as the one who takes 
care of migrants rather than poor Sicilians (Regional MP, M5S). 
Potential anti-migrant political entrepreneurs 
Finally, the case of those actors affiliated to centre-right parties that frame the effects of migration in 
securitarian terms but do not politicise migration, suggests that problem recognition is not sufficient by 
itself to place an item on the agenda. As Kingdon (2014: 114) explains, problems abound and decision-
makers “pay serious attention to only a fraction of them”, while several considerations independent of 
problem solving prompt politicians to act or not act, including attempts to “cast about ways to make 
their mark” or interest group pressure. 
These actors, indeed, mostly perceive locals to be harshly hostile to migrants – as a centre-right MP 
explains “our traditional attitude to welcome those who are suffering has turned into widespread racist 
and xenophobic attitudes” – and tend to dismiss the importance of asylum-seekers’ reception in the local 
economy. Three other elements explain their passive stances.  
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First, the way these actors assess the situation around them is mostly influenced by the lack of anti-
migrant protests in the region, which seems to lead these actors to underestimate the salience of the issue 
in the region. These interviewees, indeed, do acknowledge that a part or most of the population is hostile 
to migrants (mainly for economic reasons) but seem to be convinced that such hostility is unlikely to 
generate protests or to gain political expression, influencing people’s voting. Conversely, there seems 
to be a common perception in Sicily that electoral preferences are shaped by other more salient issues. 
As a centre-right MP puts it, “clearly, it is important to coordinate a strict opposition to potential future 
attempts to increase migration flows to our region, but we must avoid transforming local electoral 
campaigns into a struggle around an issue which is marginal” (centre-right MP). As a centre-left MP 
also explains: 
In a context where public transports are very inefficient or non-existent, waste management is a huge 
problem, having access to potable water is another big problem, people do not have a house or a job, 
well, in this context immigration is necessarily a marginal or less important issue (Centre-left MP).  
Moreover, this idea is reinforced by the common perception that the impact of immigration in Sicily 
(and on Sicilians’ perceptions) is limited because migrants do not aim to settle there:  
Since Sicily is affected by a diffused poverty, the impact of these flows is less strong (…). Some 
migrants who left the centres commit little crimes, or beg in the streets, but usually the situation is 
much worse in richer regions, where these people want to settle to develop their activities, sometimes 
legal, sometimes illegal. The only ones who settle here are those that don’t want to work and keep 
doing nothing (…). And I tell you this, as somebody who is harshly against immigration (centre-
right MP). 
Second, these actors seem to think that politicising migration is not politically convenient. The catholic 
religion, in particular, is depicted by most of these actors as a foundational element of their identity and, 
as a centre-left MP explains, influences and constraints right-wing politicians. While possibly 
underestimating the salience of the issue, these actors, in fact, seem to be afraid of the negative political 
consequences that using anti-immigration frames publicly might have on the Sicilian electorate. A 
centre-right MP adopting securitarian frames admits, indeed, that “it is hard to say openly the things I 
tell you, because if you do so you are butchered in the media”. This and other quotes suggest that actors’ 
strategies are influenced by a strong “antipopulist norm” in Sicily dictating “that politicians should not 
seek to exploit racial, ethnic or immigration-related fears in order to win votes” (Freeman, 1995: 885).  
Third, these actors seem to be influenced by some interest group pressure. Conservative parties in 
Sicily are traditionally close to the local economic elite and landowners, who often employ asylum-
seekers and irregular migrants in low-skilled and low-paid jobs, mostly in agriculture (Corrado et al., 
2018). As a centre-left MP puts it, “right-wing politicians in Sicily, with the exception of the Lega, have 
no incentives to frame migrants as a problem or an enemy and rather they tend to employ and exploit 
them in their business”. As a right-wing mayor explains:  
It is common here to employ some of these non-EU migrants in houses and enterprises. Some of 
them work permanently, or quite permanently, or seasonally, and this has become normal. And they 
are employed not only to carry out tasks that locals don’t want anymore, but also because they do it 
better, with higher dedication and greater punctuality, and certainly, on average, at a lower cost for 
employers (Right-wing mayor). 
Other centre-right interviewees mentioned, during the interview, that they personally employed some 
foreigners or asylum-seekers in their farms or factories. As one of the MPs adopting securitarian frames 
admits: 
I’m the perfect example of a person who wants to promote migrants’ integration. I have a personal 
experience in this sense, having employed in my farm some immigrants already ten years ago. I 
received them, I helped them with the family reunification, moved by humanitarian reasons and by 
the aim to integrate them in the labour market (centre-right MP).  
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In sum, the absence of anti-migrant protests – together with the strong Catholic identity and the close 
links between the conservative political elite and the local economic elite – prevents the emergence of 
anti-migrant political entrepreneurs and of a strong political contestation of migration in the Sicilian 
political debate.  
Importantly, the opposite seems also true, as Figure 4 shows. Actors’ strategies and their decision 
not to politicise migration, indeed, prevent the emergence of anti-migrant protests and the perceived 
absence of social mobilisations represents a powerful “feedback that gives information on current 
performance” (Kingdon, 2014: 113) which reinforces preconceptions of Sicilians’ tolerance. Many 
interviewees, if explicitly asked so, reported that they actually remembered some spontaneous protests 
against the asylum-seekers by locals. These protests, however, received no support by the local political 
elites and did not gain significant media coverage, unlike those in other Italian regions (Pettrachin, 
2019). In Kingdon’s words (2014: 113) “focusing events, including disasters, crises, personal 
experience, and symbols, are important, but need accompaniment in the form of preexisting perceptions 
which they reinforce, firmer indicators, or combinations with other such events”.  




This paper has questioned some of the assumptions of the existing literature on the politicisation of 
migration, which tends to ignore the reasoning of political actors to conclude that political contestation 
is a (necessary) outcome of increasing migration flows and/or anti-migrant attitudes and/or pressures 
from the far-right. Rather than examining the objective and measurable inputs and outputs of the 
politicisation process, this paper has opened the “black box” of the politicisation process, looking 
specifically at party elites’ understandings and decision-making processes.  
The analysis has shown, first, that it is not self-evident that an increase in migration flows, in the 
salience of the migration issue and social mobilisations, lead to political contestation of migration or 
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initiate reactive policy responses. As explained by Cohen et al. (1972: 16), the relationship between 
problems and solutions is not necessarily smooth-flowing. This is not to say, clearly, that we should 
always expect a radical disconnect among public reactions and actors’ politicization strategies but, 
rather, to make the point that a mere focus on objective and measurable outcomes is insufficient to catch 
the complexity of actors’ decision-making and, ultimately, of the politicisation process itself. The 
Sicilian case is very revealing in this sense. Sicily has been centrally and crucially affected by the refugee 
crisis and experienced an increase in anti-migrant attitudes and in the salience of the migration issue, 
but, despite that, migration is not politicised. Most party-actors do not politicise migration. Migration is 
largely framed as an issue that is not a matter of choice, something that is decided upon and therefore 
entails responsibility at the regional and local levels. The only issue entrepreneurs (the mayors of the 
main cities) adopt multiculturalist frames and thus promote a very unusual type of “positive 
politicisation” of migration. 
Secondly, the analysis has demonstrated that party elites’ decisions not to politicise migration is 
driven by actors’ understandings of the effects of migration on underlying social systems. Politicians, 
in other words, are not “passive recipients of information, but active choosers, interpreters and 
rationalizers” (Mutz, 2007: 91) and they form their understandings through a process of sensemaking 
that is influenced by the events and cues that they pick up from the environment around them, past 
experiences, identity processes, their social relations. The paper has crucially shown, for instance, that 
in the Sicilian case, evidence about public attitudes on migration is strongly embedded in a narrative 
story. Party-actors’ understandings of public reactions to the migrant crisis are powerfully influenced 
by what Cole (1997) defined as the “prevalence of preconceptions about Sicilian tolerance” among the 
local intelligentsia, i.e. by the widespread idea that the Sicilian population is welcoming, or tolerant, or 
not willing to mobilise against asylum-seekers, and that this acceptance is justified by Sicily’s history 
and culture. These understandings, disconnected from the reality suggested by available opinion polls, 
powerfully shape the way actors frame the situation around them, driving their decisions. Identity, in 
other words, seems to “turn out to be an issue of plausibility rather than accuracy, just as is the case for 
many issues that involve organizing and sensemaking” (Weick et al. 2005: 416). 
The perceived absence of pressures from public opinion, then, leads party-actors to develop different 
courses of action based on the attributions that they make of the situation. In the main cities the 
attributions that mayors make are largely shaped by pressures coming from civil society actors such as 
the very active NGOs and Christian churches. In rural Sicily, instead, actors’ strategies are largely 
shaped by the economic interests linked to the increasing importance of asylum-seekers’ reception in 
the stagnant economy. These attributions lead mayors and other party-actors in the main cities to adopt 
radical pro-migrant narratives and preventing potential anti-migrant entrepreneurs, particularly in the 
countryside, from publicly using anti-migrant frames. The majority of actors outside the main cities 
adopt issue-avoidance strategies. 
Finally, this paper has shown that sensemaking involves the active authoring of events and 
frameworks for understanding, as people play a role in constructing the very situations they attempt to 
comprehend (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014: 58). In other words, during the sensemaking process 
individuals, enacting the environments they face in dialogues and actions, generate a new reality, which 
can then influence or constrain the sensemaking process itself (Helms Mills et al., 2010: 185). In the 
Sicilian case, the absence of anti-migrant protests prevents the emergence of anti-migrant political 
entrepreneurs, but the absence of anti-migrant entrepreneurs in the region also prevents the emergence 
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Annex 
Table A1. Sample of Interviewees 
  




Mayors/Deputy Mayors (Villages/Towns) 15 
Mayors/Deputy Mayors (Provincial Capitals) 4 
Regional MPs 2 




Deputy Prefects 2 
Trade unions 2 
Advocacy NGOs 3 
Service Providers 4 
Experts 2 




Table A2. Political Affiliation of Party-Actors Interviewed 
  
Party Coalition Party 
N° of Semi-structured 
Interviews 
Centre-Right 
Fratelli d’Italia 1 
Lega (Noi con Salvini) 1 
Diventerà Bellissima 1 
Forza Italia 2 
Nuovo Centrodestra 3 
Centre-Left 
Partito Democratico 3 
Articolo 1-MDP 1 
I Verdi 1 
None Movimento Cinque Stelle 7 
None Independent 7 
TOTAL 27 
 
 
